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Abstract
We study a cloud network with M distributed receiving antennas and L users, which transmit their
messages towards a centralized decoder (CD), where M ≥ L. We consider that the cloud network
applies the Compute-and-Forward (C&F) protocol, where L antennas/relays are selected to decode
integer equations of the transmitted messages. In this work, we focus on the best relay selection and
the optimization of the Physical-Layer Network Coding (PNC) at the relays, aiming at the throughput
maximization of the network. Existing literature optimizes PNC with respect to the maximization of the
minimum rate among users. The proposed strategy maximizes the sum rate of the users allowing non-
symmetric rates, while the optimal solution is explored with the aid of the Pareto frontier. The problem
of relay selection is matched to a coalition formation game, where the relays and the CD cooperate
in order to maximize their profit. Efficient coalition formation algorithms are proposed, which perform
joint relay selection and PNC optimization. Simulation results show that a considerable improvement is
achieved compared to existing results, both in terms of the network sum rate and the players’ profits.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Radio Access Networks (C-RANs) have recently attracted the interest of both academic
research and industry [1]–[3]. The C-RAN concept is implemented based on cloud computing
and separation of radio antennas and base stations (BSs), with the latter being replaced by one
or more cloud Base Stations (CBSs). Several operations traditionally performed at the BSs, such
as network management, handover management, cooperation enforcement etc., are now moved
to the CBS. Therefore, this approach decreases capital and operational costs, since it better takes
advantage of the processing power of the CBS, which comprises distributed processing resources
(e.g. data centers in different locations). Thus, the traditional communication network is replaced
by the shared communication and processing infrastructure of the cloud, which is handled by
different operators in a distributed manner. However, C-RAN architecture simultaneously arises
many design and implementation challenges caused by the limitations of wireless links [4].
C-RAN architecture involves wireless cloud networks comprised by multiple nodes, which
transmit their messages simultaneously. Various techniques have been proposed for forwarding
messages in these networks, such as Compress-and-Forward [5], Quantize-reMap-and-Forward
(QMF) [6] and Noisy Network Coding [7]. Most of these techniques are complex, while the
additive noise builds up with each retransmission, since decoding is not performed at intermediate
nodes. A promising alternative is Compute-and-Forward (C&F) relaying, first introduced in the
pioneering work of B. Nazer and M. Gastpar [8] for general relay networks. This relaying
technique exploits interference in multiuser wireless networks, by decoding integer equations of
the transmitted coded messages by multiple users, using nested lattice codes [9]. The decoded
equations are then forwarded by the relays towards a Centralized Decoder (CD) which, having
enough independent equations, decodes the transmitted messages from all users. The choice of
integer equation coefficients at each C&F relay is performed with the use of Physical Layer
Network Coding (PNC) [10], a special case of Network Coding (NC) [11], [12], which makes
use of the additive nature of the wireless medium to combine different source messages, simul-
taneously arriving at the destination. The C&F relaying protocol is an attractive choice for cloud
networks that aim at reducing the complexity at the backbone by decentralized processing at the
relaying nodes. Each node performs lattice decoding, a rather simple decoding technique, which
does not require a complex node architecture (e.g. a quantizer, a Maximum-Likelihood decoder
3etc.). However, when multiple relays forward equations to the CD, a joint optimization of the
PNC must be performed.
In future cloud networks with shared infrastructure [13], the most challenging case is when
the antennas and the cloud backhaul of the network belong to different operators, which want
to maximize their profit. Game theory provides a formal analytical framework with a set of
mathematical tools to study the complex interactions among rational players. Game theory is
employed in numerous works which investigate network selection in heterogeneous networks
[14], [15] and competition or cooperation among operators [16]–[18]. Furthermore, game theory
has emerged as a tool for communication network analysis and specifically network coding [19]–
[21], providing several approaches for the strategy of the network nodes-players, individual or
cooperative. Specifically in a C&F network, in the lack of a single BS which can accommodate
all users, multiple relays serve the users, which need to cooperate in order to increase the profit
of their operators. Thus, the behavior and interactions of self-organizing C&F relays can be
analyzed using game theoretical tools, especially coalitional games.
A. Motivation
This work is motivated by the complex problem of PNC optimization at the relays, in the
uplink of wireless cloud network, employing C&F. When a C&F relay chooses the equation
coefficients independently, a criterion which defines its strategy can be the maximization of the
achievable computation rate region [8]. This maximization has no analytical solution, but various
works have proposed algorithmic solutions to this problem, using Lenstra-Lenstra-Lova´sz (LLL)
lattice reduction [22], geometric programming [23] and a modified Fincke-Pohst method [24],
among others. However, when various C&F relays choose their equations independently, a set of
linearly independent equations is not guaranteed at the CD’s side, the sum rate is not maximized
and the optimization of individual computation rates does not lead to the maximization of each
operator’s profit.
In [24], the authors propose an optimization of the equation coefficient vectors, so that the
relays provide the CD with a set of independent equations. The optimization criterion is the
maximization of the minimum transmission rate among the sources. Similar strategy was followed
in [25] for Complete-C&F and Incomplete-C&F. However, although these works optimize the
PNC without resorting to an exhaustive search for the first time, both approaches do not address
4the maximization of the total throughput, i.e. the sum rate. This is a crucial metric of the network
performance, since the users usually pay according to the data volume they transmit or receive.
The optimization of the sum rate is partially dealt with in [26], [27] and [28]. In [26], [27],
relay and user selection for a CBS employing C&F and its low complexity version, named
Quantized C&F [29], are investigated. For the uplink, the relays choose their equation coefficients
independently and after a decomposition of the network into subnetworks, a greedy algorithm
within each subnetwork for the best selection of relays, is performed. However, although the
solution in [26] and [27] is ingenious, it is in general suboptimal, since it considers only
symmetric transmission rates within each subnetwork, while the relays always choose one specific
coefficient vector each, beforehand. Therefore, no cooperation or tradeoff between relays for the
rates’ optimization can be performed. The authors in [28] also concentrate on the symmetric
rate case, not allowing non-symmetric transmission rates, a choice which can lead to an overall
increase of the total throughput. The need for cooperation calls for the formulation of proper
incentives and corresponding rules that will model the cooperation between relays, which can
be offered by a game theoretic framework.
B. Contribution
In this work, the uplink of a C&F Cloud Base Station (CBS) is considered, employing surplus
relays with respect to the number of the sources. A practical scenario in which neither the relays
(distributed antennas) not the cloud CD belong to the same operator is considered, which is
crucial for future distributed heterogeneous cloud-based networks. Moreover, operator profits
are introduced, which are based on the provided services to the users. Thus, in this work we
establish the incentive for cooperation among the relays and the cloud CD by formulating a
coalition game, leading to a joint optimization of PNC.
Notice that previous studies aim at the maximization of the minimum transmission rate [24],
[25] or the symmetric transmission rate. In this paper, we consider the sum rate allowing non-
symmetric rates at the sources, which is the most important metric of the network performance.
Furthermore, since the maximization of the minimum transmission rate and the maximization
of the sum rate are two objectives which may be conflicting and non-commensurable, we use
the Pareto frontier to define the dominating solutions and to show the tradeoff between the
maximization of the two rates.
5In order to investigate the cloud’s incentive to reach the optimal solution in terms of sum
rate, coalitional game theory is applied, aiming at the maximization of the cloud’s revenue. The
impact of relay selection in a C&F network is also investigated. Extensive simulations over fading
channels have been conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed coalition formation
algorithms.
The contribution of this work is summarized in the following:
• The optimal relay selection and PNC, which maximize the sum rate of the C&F network
under constraints for the minimum rate, is studied with the use of Pareto frontier.
• The relay selection is matched to a game-theoretical coalition formulation problem which
aims at the maximization of the cloud revenue, while the profits of the relays’ and the CD’s
operators are introduced.
• Efficient coalition formation algorithms are proposed, which converge to a solution belong-
ing to the core. As illustrated by the results, the proposed method leads to great sum rate
gains compared to previous works, with simultaneous optimization of the cloud revenue. It
is remarkable that the algorithmic optimization may be more beneficial compared to just
adding more relays to the network.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the system model, the achievable
rates of a C&F network and the problem statement are presented. In Section III, the joint
network coding optimization is studied with the use of Pareto frontier. The game model and the
proposed coalition formation algorithms are presented in Sections IV and V respectively. Specific
examples and simulation results are discussed in Section VI and Section VII respectively, while
the conclusions are given in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Cloud Compute-and-Forward Relaying
We consider the uplink of a real-valued1 cloud C&F network, which consists of two units,
i) the baseband unit (BBU), which corresponds to the CBS and contains the CD of the C&F
scheme, and ii) the remote radio head (RRH), which corresponds to the available relays or
1The results of this work can be directly extended to complex-valued systems (see also [8]).
6Fig. 1. Cloud Compute-and-Forward network with relay selection.
antennas [1]. The CBS receives messages from L sources, denoted by Sl, l = 1, 2, . . . , L, which
transmit messages encoded using a lattice code [9], while the RRH consists of M relays, denoted
by Rm, m = 1, 2, . . . ,M , where M ≥ L. As shown in Fig.1, the relays are connected to the
CBS via error free bit pipes as in [8] (e.g. optical fibers with fixed rate R0 which is considered
to be much higher than the rates achieved over the wireless medium).
The channel matrix between the sources and the relays H is an L×M matrix, given by
H = [h1,h2, . . . ,hM ], (1)
where hm is the channel coefficient vector of length L as seen by the relay Rm, that is
hm = [hm,1, hm,2, . . . , hm,L]
T , (2)
where hm,l is the real channel coefficient between the source Sl and the relay Rm, and [·]T
denotes a matrix or vector transpose. Note that, in the case of complex Gaussian circularly
symmetric fading channels, the real channel coefficients are produced by the projection of the
complex channel on the in-phase axis, and thus, they follow a Gaussian distribution, which is
considered here as N (0, 1). Each relay has perfect CSI of the channels between the sources and
the specific relay, but no CSI is considered at the transmitters [8].
In [8], a C&F relay performs lattice decoding, thus, each is comprised by two units, the radio
function unit (RFU) which filters and possibly converts the frequency of the received signal, and
the signal processing unit (SPU) which performs the baseband processing of the signal. At the
7RFU, each relay receives a signal
ym =
L∑
l=1
hm,lxl + zm, (3)
where xl ∈ RN is the signal vector transmitted by the source Sl, ym ∈ RN is the received vector
by the relay Rm, N is the dimension of the nested lattice code [9] used in the C&F scheme and
zm ∈ RN is the noise vector which follows a normal distribution N (0, IN×N), with 0 being the
zero vector of length N and IN×N being the N ×N identity matrix. Each transmitted signal is
subject to a power constraint P , i.e. 1
N
‖xl‖2 ≤ P , where ‖ · ‖ denotes the vector norm.
The SPUs of the relays decode integer equations of the transmitted vectors, with equation
coefficients given by the vectors
am = [am,1, am,2, . . . , am,L]
T , am ∈ Z
L. (4)
Each relay, thus, decodes a codeword
xˆm =
[
L∑
l=1
am,lxl
]
modΛ, (5)
where [·]modΛ is the modulo lattice operation on the coarse lattice of the nested lattice code in
use [8], [9].
The CD can decode all messages if it is provided with L independent equations. The CD
inverts the L×L network coding matrix A, whose columns are the equation coefficient vectors
am of the L selected relays, so the network coding matrix A must be full rank:
A = [am1, am2, . . .amL], (6)
where m1, m2, . . . , mL are the indices of the L selected relays. Note that the entries of A are
integer numbers. We consider am = 0 for the relays which are not selected.
According to the different function splitting between the BBU and the RRH, there are two
cloud architectures, named partial centralization and full centralization [1]. We adopt partial
centralization, as depicted in Fig. 2, where the RRH integrates both the radio function and
the baseband signal processing performed by the SPUs. Thus, the relays can communicate
their candidate equation coefficient vectors and achievable rates during the optimization process
through the cloud. After relay selection, only the selected relays perform equation decoding
and forward the estimated codewords xˆm in (5) towards the CD, while the rest of the relays
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Fig. 2. Partial centralization architecture with relay selection.
remain silent or turn off, as indicated by gray color in Fig. 2. The CD corresponds to the BBU
and performs the inversion of the network coding matrix A and the decoding of the messages
transmitted by the sources. While the relays and the CD are cooperating nodes, there is no
need for wireless overhead, since all information regarding the choice of the equation coefficient
vectors am is circulated via the error free bit pipes which connect the RRH to the BBU. More
specifically, each relay needs to send each own set of candidate vectors and corresponding
achievable rates towards the CD, only when the channel coefficients change.
B. Compute-and-Forward Rate Region
The choice of the equation coefficient vector determines the rate that a relay can achieve,
while decoding equations of messages. It was proven in [8] that the achievable computation rate
region of a relay Rm for a given choice of am and given channel coefficients is
Rrm =
1
2
log+2


(
‖am‖
2 −
P
(
hTmam
)2
1 + P‖hm‖2
)−1 , (7)
where log+2 (·) = max (log2(·), 0) and (·)r denotes the computation rate of a relay. The maxi-
mization of the rate in (7) with respect to the equation coefficient vector am is achieved when
[22]
am = arg min
a∈ZL,a 6=0
aTGa, (8)
where G = IL×L − Phmh
T
m
1+P‖hm‖2
.
Now, each transmitter encodes a message wl ∈ Fklp , where Fp is a p-sized field with p being
a prime, onto a lattice codeword xl ∈ RN . Thus, the rate of each transmitter is Rsl = klN log2 p,
9where (·)s denotes a transmission rate from a source. For a given achievable rate of each source,
suitable choices for the values of kl, N and p, must be found, as discussed in [8]. The transmission
rate of a given source is bounded by the minimum computation rate among only those relays
which decode an equation containing the codeword transmitted by this source. That is [8],
Rsl ≤ min
am,l 6=0
Rrm. (9)
C. Problem Statement
Previous works [24], [25] have performed the optimization of the PNC in C&F networks, based
on the maximization of the minimum computation rate, which implies a symmetric transmission
rate scenario. This optimization ensures that no user will transmit with very low rate. However,
this optimization does not guarantee that the total throughput of the network is also maximized,
especially in the case of non-symmetric transmission rates, since according to (9), the l-th user’s
transmission rate is defined only by those equation coefficient vectors with non-zero elements
at the l-th position. The above lead to the following two observations:
Remark 1: In a network with symmetric rates, the common transmission rate is the minimum
computation rate. When non-symmetric transmission rates are allowed, a vector a ∈ A, which
achieves the minimum computation rate, defines only those transmission rates corresponding to
its non-zero elements, while the rest of the rates are defined by other vectors in A which achieve
higher rates.
Remark 2: When non-symmetric rates are considered, the maximization of the sum rate is
not equivalent to the maximization of the minimum transmission rate. Choosing a vector a
which contains many zero elements and defines the minimum rate may be favorable compared
to another with less zero elements and higher computation rate. This shows that there are cases
when decreasing the minimum rate may increase the sum rate.
In a network where each operator of an antenna (relay) or of the CD is rewarded according to
the throughput that it serves, the maximization of the total throughput is of utmost importance.
Furthermore, each user does not have the same needs for high transmission rates. For example,
a user uploading a sort message (e.g. a tweet) and a user uploading a video, do not require the
same upload rate from the service provider. All of the above lead to the need of maximizing the
sum rate of the network, under specific constraints on the minimum transmission rate that each
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user accepts. Thus, the tradeoff between minimum transmission rate and sum rate is considered,
while the optimal solution is examined in Section III.
The optimal solution in terms of sum rate cannot be acquired, without the collaboration of
the relays. If each relay individually transmits its best equation in terms of computation rate, the
following may occur: i) The availability of a set of L independent equations is not guaranteed.
If there are not enough independent equations, then the system is in outage. ii) If each relay
chooses only its best equation in terms of computation rate, a) it may not contribute to the final
coding matrix A, in which case it does not serve any throughput, and thus it gains no profit, b)
if it contributes to the coding matrix, there may be another solution, in which it could contribute
with another equation, achieving higher total throughput. In the latter case, its profit would be
higher.
Similar observations are made for the CD. If it randomly chooses L equations, its profit is
not necessarily maximized. Thus, the problem naturally leads to the need of cooperation among
relays and CD, with the aim to achieve the optimal solution in terms of sum rate. Therefore, the
problem is matched to a coalition formation game, where each player seeks to form a coalition
which achieves the maximum sum rate and the maximum profit for the relays and the CD. The
game is formulated in Section IV.
III. NETWORK MANAGEMENT
A. Physical Layer Network Coding Optimization Criterion
In practical networks, the requirements of each user in terms of rate are different (e.g. they
use different kind of services etc.). Furthermore, the prices paid by the users for the services
of the operators are proportional to the rates they achieve. Thus, an optimal strategy for such a
network is the maximization of the sum rate under the fulfilment of minimum requirements for
each user. This criterion can be formulated as
find A = arg max
|A|6=0
(
L∑
l=1
Rsl
)
subject to Rsl ≥ Vl, l = 1, 2, . . . , L,
(10)
where Vl is minimum rate requirement of the l-th source. In case when Vl = V , ∀l, then the
optimization criterion corresponds to the maximization of the sum rate, under a constraint for
the minimum rate among users.
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B. The Pareto Frontier
In this section, we investigate the case when the minimum rate requirement is the same for all
users, i.e. Vl = V , ∀l. Often, the maximization of the sum rate and the minimum transmission
rate are two conflicting strategies, as explained in Remark 2. To better investigate and face this
conflict, we utilize the concept of Pareto frontier, which is defined formally as follows.
Definition 1: Pareto frontier: The Pareto frontier is the set of matrices that are not strictly
dominated by any other matrix. A matrix A′ is said to Pareto dominate another solution matrix
A (A′ ≻ A), if
(
min
m:am∈A′
Rrm ≥ min
m:am∈A
Rrm
)
∩

 L∑
l=1
am∈A′
Rsl >
L∑
l=1
am∈A
Rsl

 , (11)
or (
min
m:am∈A′
Rrm > min
m:am∈A
Rrm
)
∩

 L∑
l=1
am∈A′
Rsl ≥
L∑
l=1
am∈A
Rsl

 . (12)
Formally, this defines a partial order on all possible matrices A, and the Pareto Frontier is the
set of maximal elements with respect to this order. Note that there may be multiple matrices A
which achieve the same sum rate under specific minimum rate requirements. In that case, these
matrices are equivalent and the selection of any of these matrices does not affect the performance
of the network and the players’ payoffs, as they will be defined in the next section.
When there is a matrix A which Pareto dominates all the other possible matrices, then the
Pareto Frontier consists of only one element, the Pareto optimal point. When such a point is
available, then this matrix maximizes simultaneously both the minimum rate and the sum rate
of the network. However, when there is no Pareto optimal point, then it is obvious that the two
optimization criteria lead to a different network coding solution.
In the case of different Vl for each source, the matrices A which do not achieve all minimum
requirements set by the users, are excluded by the set of solutions beforehand, as it will be
described in detail in Section V. Then, the optimization is again performed considering the
tradeoff between minimum and sum rate.
The points on the Pareto frontier achieve different sum rate. The solution of the optimization
problem in (10) is the point on the Pareto frontier which achieves the maximum sum rate, while
at the same time, it holds that min
m:am∈A
Rrm ≥ V .
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IV. PNC AS A COALITIONAL GAME FOR COOPERATION AMONG RELAYS AND CLOUD CD
In this section, a very challenging scenario is examined, in which neither the relays (distributed
antennas) not the cloud CD belong to the same operator. The practical meaning behind this is
that the communication operators will make profit for providing services,while the price paid
by the users will compensate the use of the relays and the use of the cloud CD, yielding
the corresponding profit to the providers of the respective infrastructure. This separation is a
fundamental step toward the distributed heterogeneous cloud-based networks. The objective of
this section is to investigate which is the incentive for cooperation among the relays and the
cloud CD, and the formation of coalitions.
A. Coalition Formation Game: Basics
For the purpose of deriving an algorithm that allows the relays to form coalitions in a
distributed manner, we use notions from cooperative game theory. In this regard, we formulate the
cooperative relay selection problem of the previous section as a coalitional game in characteristic
form with transferable utility (TU). Below we define the game and its essential elements [20].
Definition 2: Game: A coalitional game with TU is defined by a pair (N , v) where N =
M∪C is the set of players which includes the setM of available relays and the cloud CD, denoted
by C. The function v is defined over the real line such that for every coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is a
real number describing the amount of utility that coalition S receives and which can be distributed
in any arbitrary manner among the members of the coalition. The information available at each
decision point includes the set of candidate vectors and corresponding computation rates. The
actions available to the players at each decision point are whether they will enter or leave a
coalition, and which candidate equation coefficient vector the relays will choose.
Both the relays and the cloud CD are paid by the sources proportionally to the offered QoS.
When the objective of the sources is the maximization of their rate, then each user pays according
to the achieved transmission rate, so the total payment received by the cloud depends on the
sum rate. In this case, the revenue, i.e. the total payment that a coalition receives per channel
use, is given by
v(S) =


Z
L∑
l=1
Rsl , |S| ≥ L+ 1, C ∈ S,R
s
l ≥ Vl, ∀l
0, otherwise
(13)
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where Z is the payment of the users concerning the use of relays and the use of the cloud CD,
per exchanged bit. By (13), it is evident that the revenue is non-zero, when there are at least L
available equations, the CD is in the coalition in order to detect the original messages, while at
the same time the QoS constraints of the users are met. The last constraint in (13) implies that
the users will not pay if their transmission rate of the network is too low. When the constraints
are not met, then neither the relays nor the cloud CD will be rewarded, and thus they are forced
to form a new partition which satisfies these constraints. In the case of the existence of a user
whose QoS requirements cannot be met in any way, this user is discarded and the rest of the
users are served by the cloud (a new number L of users is selected and the game is repeated).
Finally, only the coalition that includes the cloud CD will be rewarded, i.e. the coalition of relays
which cooperate with the CD towards the decoding of the transmitted messages.
Since (13) represents a revenue gained by the coalition, i.e., a certain amount of money, it can
thus be divided in any arbitrary manner between the members of S, which implies that we have
a game with transferable utility. Although a number of fairness criteria (e.g., egalitarian fair,
Shapley value, nucleolus, etc.) exist for the division of payoffs, we consider that the payment is
firstly divided among the cloud CD and the relays, while among the relays we adopt the equal
fair allocation rule. Thus, when the TU is non-zero, the payoff of any player i ∈ S, denoted by
φi(S) is
φi(S) =


b
(|S|−1)
v(S), i 6= C
(1− b) v(S), i = C
(14)
where 0 < b. Thus, b is the portion of the TU concerning the revenue of the relays and (1− b)
is the portion concerning the revenue of the cloud CD. The payment concerning the relays is
equally divided among the relays (i.e., b|S|−1 , since |S|−1 is the number of relays in the coalition),
because each relay contributes in the same way for the decoding of each user’s message.
Note that the information between players is exchanged through the CD and via error free bit
pipes, thus there is no need for wireless interaction between the relays. In fact, the interaction
between players at each decision point may be virtual. In this case, the players forward their
sets of candidate equation vectors and achievable rates only once to the BBU, where the game
is played in a centralized manner, as depicted in Fig. 2.
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B. Preference Relations and Core Partition
We first cite the following definitions [30], for sake of completeness of our analysis.
Definition 3: Preference relation: A preference relation, denoted by i is a reflexive, com-
plete and transitive binary relation on Si(N ) = {S ∈ 2N : i ∈ S}. Strict preference relation and
the indifference relation are denoted by ≻i and ∼i respectively (S ≻i T ⇐⇒ [S i T and T 6i
S] and S ∼i T ⇐⇒ [S i T and T i S]).
Definition 4: Partition: A coalition structure pi = {S1,S2, . . . ,SK}, (K ≤ |N | is a positive
integer) is a partition of N . That is, Sk 6= ∅ for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K},
⋃K
k=1 Sk = N , and
Sl∩Sk = ∅ for any k, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K} with k 6= l. For any coalition structure pi and any player
i let pi(i) = {S ∈ pi : i ∈ S} be the set of their partners. The collection of all coalition structures
in N is denoted by Π(N ).
Definition 5: Core partition: A coalition T ∈ 2N\{∅} is a profitable coalitional deviation
from pi ∈ Π(N ) iff T i pi(i) for any i ∈ T . A core partition is a partition pi∗ that is immune
to any coalitional deviation.
Theorem 1: The game (N , v), as described in section IV-A, has a non-empty core.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Following, we also prove that a specific partition of the players is a core partition.
Theorem 2: Let S∗ ⊆ N be a coalition which maximizes the sum rate, contains exactly L
relays and the CD, that is, S∗ = {S∗ ∋ C, |S∗| = L + 1, v(S∗) = Zmax
(∑L
l=1R
s
l
)
}. The
partition pi∗ = {S∗,S1, . . .SM−L : |Si| = 1, i = 1, . . . ,M − L} is a core partition, that is, the
partition containing the coalition S∗ and all the rest of the players as individuals (if any), is
immune to any profitable coalitional deviation.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
We note here that the rules of split and merge or switch do not guarantee that the game will
reach a core partition, since they pose strong assumptions on the limits of mobility that the
players have [19]. Moreover, the aforementioned rules do not dictate which is the best choice of
equation coefficient vector for each relay, even if a coalition is formed. Thus, in the following
section we present a coalition formation algorithm where the players care about the size of
their coalition, as dictated by Theorem 2, and also choose the equation coefficient vectors that
maximize the sum rate within the coalition. Considering an ordering of the candidate equation
coefficient vectors of all players according to the achievable computation rates as was done in
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[24], the proposed algorithm forms coalitions of specific size. The players join the coalition
sequentially, as in [31], based on the order of the candidate equation coefficient vectors.
V. COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we present an algorithmic strategy which aims to find the optimal partition
of the players and the optimal coding vectors within the coalition which contains the CD, as
described in Section IV. We first describe the formation of the candidate equation coefficient
vectors which are available for each relay, and then we present the coalition formation strategy
of the players.
A. Formation of the candidate equation coefficient vector sets
The problem of finding the best equation coefficient vector given in (8) can be mapped
to finding the shortest vector on a lattice with generator matrix G, as in [22]. Thus, various
algorithms are used, which originate in applications of lattice theory, such as the Fincke-Pohst
method [32], a modified version of which was used in [24], or LLL lattice basis reduction with
Schnorr - Euchner enumeration which was used in [27]. These algorithms can be also used
to find a set of candidate coefficient vectors, denoted by Ωm, which are the best in terms of
achievable computation rate of the m-th relay.
In this section, we define the appropriate length of these sets based on various criteria, while
we further eliminate some of the candidate vectors found by the aforementioned algorithms in
the literature, which can be a priori excluded, since they do not contribute to the achievable rate
or the full rank property of A. To this end, the following lemma is first presented.
Lemma 1: If a1 is a candidate equation coefficient vector corresponding to a channel coeffi-
cient vector h, and a2 = λa1, where λ ∈ Z, |λ| > 1, then the computation rate achieved using
a1 is greater than the one achieved using a2.
Proof: The computation rate using a2 is calculated as
Rr (a2) =
1
2
log+2


(
‖a2‖
2 −
P
(
hTa2
)2
1 + P‖h‖2
)−1
=
1
2
log+2

λ−2
(
‖a1‖
2 −
P
(
hTa1
)2
1 + P‖h‖2
)−1 = max (Rr (a1)− log2 (|λ|) , 0) ,
(15)
which concludes the proof, since log2 (|λ|) > 0.
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Corollary 1: Between all collinear candidate equation coefficient vectors, the one achieving
the best computation rate is the one whose elements have their greatest common divisor (GCD)
equal to 1.
Proof: If a1 is a vector with elements with GCD equal to 1, every other collinear vector a2
can be written as a2 = λa1, where λ is the GCD of the elements of a2, while its sign depends on
whether a1 and a2 have the same or opposite direction and |λ| > 1. Thus, according to Lemma
1, a1 achieves greater computation rate. This concludes the proof.
The complexity of the proposed algorithm depends on the length of sets Ωm. Thus, the
termination of adding vectors to the candidate equation coefficient vector set Ωm is crucial
and may be chosen according to different criteria. We concentrate on three cases: i)guaranteeing
the existence of at least one full rank matrix, ii) satisfying specific minimum rate requirements Vl
for each source l, iii) satisfying a complexity / performance optimization trade-off of a practical
system. In the first case, the selection of candidates terminates when the sets Ωm span the L-
dimensional space for the first time, since at that case, at least one full rank matrix A exists.
In the second case, the addition of vectors terminates when it no longer holds Rrm ≥ Vl when
am,l 6= 0, that is, the achievable computation rates satisfy the constraints set by each user. In the
third case, the size of the sets is defined by the complexity constraints of a practical system.
Therefore, a smaller size of sets can be selected in order to reduce the complexity, at the expense
of the network performance.
After the termination of adding vectors to the sets Ωm, we delete all the vectors which have
a GCD different than 1, (implementation of Corollary 1), and keep one of the two vectors, if
a pair of opposite vectors appears in Ωm. According to the candidate set Ωm, each relay also
constructs the set of corresponding achievable computation rates, denoted by Γm.
B. Coalition formation strategy
The proposed strategy aims to find the best partition of players, containing the top-coalition
S∗ of L players and the CD, as described in Theorem 2. Note that, such a coalition achieves
the best non-zero utility and the corresponding partition pi∗ is in the core, as proven in Theorem
2, so in the following, the term coalition is used to denote the top-coalition S∗ of L relays
cooperating with the CD.
In the proposed algorithm, the players sort their achievable computation rates in descending
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order in a list Q, so that the vectors achieving the best rates are used first, as done in [24]
and in the greedy algorithm of [27]. However, it continues searching for solutions on the Pareto
frontier, instead of stopping when the minimum rate is maximized. The strategy of the players
is described as follows:
1) The initial partition consists of the coalition which contains the CD and L relays and also
maximizes the minimum rate. A modified version of the algorithm proposed in [24] is used.
As explained, the solution offered by this coalition may not be a point on the Pareto frontier.
2) The players try to form a coalition with the CD which a) contains the relay which achieved
the minimum computation rate in the coalition of step (1), so that the minimum rate is
unchanged, b) contains L−1 relays achieving higher computation rates than the aforemen-
tioned relay, c) achieves higher sum rate than the coalition in step (1), and the best sum
rate among all coalitions with the same minimum rate. Dominated solutions are excluded
from this search, with the use of a weight function for each candidate vector, described in
the next subsection. Thus, only vectors with a suitable weight are considered.
3) If such a coalition as described in step (2) can be found, then the coalition of step (1)
deforms, and the coalition in step (2) forms. Note that in this case, the new coalition
corresponds to a point on the Pareto frontier. If no such coalition can be found, then the
coalition of step (1) corresponds to a point on the Pareto frontier.
4) The players now check if they can form a coalition which decreases the minimum rate
but increases the sum rate. Again, only vectors with suitable weight are considered. Note
that, since the QoS requirements of the users are a priori satisfied when the vector sets are
constructed, the minimum rate can be gradually reduced with a search among the sorted
list Q.
5) If such a coalition can be found, the previous coalition deforms and the coalition of step (4)
forms. The new coalition corresponds to a new point on the Pareto frontier which achieves
a higher sum rate.
6) Steps (4) and (5) are repeated until no other coalition with higher sum rate can be found.
The stable partition contains the coalition which corresponds to the Point on the Pareto
frontier with the highest sum rate.
The above procedure can be summarized in Algorithm 1.
18
Algorithm 1 : Coalition Formation
1: Step 1 The players form a partition which contains a coalition of L relays and the CD, with
corresponding coding matrix A1, for which:
2: A1 = arg max
|A|6=0
(
min
m:am∈A
Rrm
)
.
3: Step 2 The players search for a new partition containing a coalition with coding matrix A2,
for which:
4: min
m:am∈A1
Rrm = min
m:am∈A2
Rrm and
5: 6 ∃i :
(
min
m:am∈A2
Rrm = min
m:am∈Ai
Rrm
)
∩

 L∑
l=1
am∈A2
Rsl <
L∑
l=1
am∈Ai
Rsl


.
6: Step 3
7: if there is such a coalition with coding matrix A2, then the coalition of Step 1 deforms and
the coalition of Step 2 forms, while the output matrix of this step is A3 = A2.
8: else, A3 = A1.
9: end if
10: After this step, the current coalition corresponds to a point on the Pareto frontier, with coding
matrix A3.
11: Step 4 The players search for a new partition containing a coalition with coding matrix A4,
for which:
12: min
m:am∈A4
Rrm < min
m:am∈A3
Rrm,
L∑
l=1
am∈A4
Rsl ≥
L∑
l=1
am∈A3
Rsl , and
13: 6 ∃i :
(
min
m:am∈A4
Rrm = min
m:am∈Ai
Rrm
)
∩

 L∑
l=1
am∈A4
Rsl <
L∑
l=1
am∈Ai
Rsl


.
14: Step 5
15: if there is such a coalition with coding matrix A4, then the coalition of Step 3 deforms and
the coalition of Step 4 forms, while the output matrix of this step is A5 = A4. Steps 4 and
5 are repeated with new A3 = A5, until the algorithm stops.
16: else, A5 = A3 and the algorithm stops.
17: end if
18: After this step, the current coalition corresponds to the point on the Pareto frontier, which
achieves the highest sum rate.
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C. Elimination of dominated solutions: the weight function
During the process of forming coalitions, each relay has many candidate coefficients that it
can use. However, some of them may a priori be excluded from the search, since they cannot
lead to a higher sum rate. In order to exclude these dominated solutions, we introduce a weight
function which computes an ideal sum rate for each vector, based on the vectors selected by
other relays which are already in a coalition, plus the best possible choice of vectors for the
relays that will enter the coalition afterwards.
More specifically, this weight is constructed by i) the already defined transmission rates due
to other vectors in the candidate coalition, ii) the transmission rates which are defined by the
specific candidate vector for which the weight is computed, and iii) the best possible transmission
rates that can be achieved in the current list Q of all computation rates of the relays, for all those
sources with still undetermined transmission rates. The function which computes the weight for
a candidate vector a is given in Algorithm 2. Matrix AL−l contains all vectors of players which
are already in the candidate coalition, while l indicates the number of relays which are needed,
so that a coalition will be of L players and the CD.
Note that the use of weights is a strategy of elimination of dominated solutions, so that an
exhaustive search is not needed. The possible combinations of vectors for a full rank matrix A
are drastically reduced since there is no need to search all the elements of the sorted list Q.
Algorithm 2 : weight(l, Q,AL−l, a)
1: The player with candidate vector a computes the following weight
2: i. The player checks the vectors in the matrix AL−l and computes the transmission rates
that are already defined by this matrix, using (9).
3: ii. The player computes the transmission rates which are determined by the vector a.
4: iii. If there are still undetermined transmission rates, they are computed according to the
vector in Q with the maximum possible rate, which has non-zero corresponding element and
belongs to the candidate set of a relay which is not the current player or does not contribute
to the matrix AL−l, that is, it is not in the candidate coalition.
5: iv. The weight of a is the sum of the above determined transmission rates.
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Fig. 3. Study case for a network with L = 4 sources and M = 5 relays for a channel realization which leads to a solution set
with Pareto frontier.
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
A. Pareto Frontier and Pareto Optimal Point Examples
In this section we present two examples concerning a network with L = 4 sources and M = 5
relays, for two random channel instances and P = 10 dB. These examples present the solution
sets containing all possible full rank matrices A, and the minimum and sum rate that each
solution achieves.
In Fig. 3, the Pareto frontier consists of three distinct points, marked with asterisks. These
solutions illustrate the tradeoff between the maximization of the minimum rate and the maximiza-
tion of the sum rate. We consider that the minimum rate requirement of all the users is 0.2359
bits/Hz/Channel use2. Note that, after Step 2 of the coalition formation algorithm is applied, the
coalition which forms is the one which corresponds to point Z. When Step 4 is applied for the
first time, the coalition which forms corresponds to point Y, while after the second time Step 4
is applied, the coalition which forms corresponds to point X and the algorithm stops.
In the second example, depicted in Fig. 4, the solution set contains a Pareto optimal point,
marked with asterisk. We consider that the users do not have specific rate requirements, so they
2This choice corresponds to the value which ensures that all sets Ωm span the L-dimensional space and thus at least one full
rank matrix A exists.
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Fig. 4. Study case for a network with L = 4 sources and M = 5 relays for a channel realization which leads to a solution set
with Pareto optimal point.
are set to zero. Note that, as shown in Fig. 4, apart form the Pareto optimal point, there is
also another point which maximizes the minimum rate, but does not achieve the maximum sum
rate. In this case, when Step 1 of the algorithm is applied, any of these two points may be
chosen, since the optimization is performed according to the maximization of the minimum rate.
However, when Step 2 is also applied, it leads to the best possible solution, both in terms of
minimum rate and sum rate, which is the Pareto optimal point.
B. Transparent Realization
In this section we present a numerical example of the implementation of the proposed algo-
rithms. We consider a network with L = 4 transmitters and M = 5 relays, operating with power
constraint P = 10 dB. This example corresponds to the solution set depicted in Fig. 3, where
Vl = V = 0.2359 bits/Hz/channel use. The optimization is performed for the following channel
coefficient vectors for each relay respectively:
h1 = [1.1408 0.9331 − 0.5206 − 0.5897]
T
,h2 = [−0.8927 0.9095 0.3323 0.2708]
T
,
h3 = [−0.6112 1.1819 0.6595 − 0.7272]
T
,h4 = [−1.0152 − 0.4052 − 0.5168 − 0.2829]
T
,
h5 = [−1.1169 − 0.8165 − 0.4853 0.6650]
T
.
(16)
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The sets Ωm which are constructed as described in Section V-A are given below:
Ω1 =
[
2 1 1 2 1
2 1 1 1 1
−1 −1 0 −1 0
−1 −1 0 −1 −1
]
, Ω2 =
[
−1 0 −1 −1 −2
1 1 0 1 2
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
]
, Ω3 =
[
−1 −1 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0
−1 −1 0 −1 −1
]
,
Ω4 =
[
−1 −1 −2 −2
0 0 −1 −1
0 −1 −1 −1
0 0 −1 0
]
, Ω5 =
[
−2 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 −1 −1 0 −1
−1 −1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
]
.
(17)
The corresponding Γm sets containing the achievable rates are
Γ1 = [0.5984 0.5107 0.4825 0.4588 0.4367],Γ2 = [0.8742 0.4100 0.3901 0.3544 0.2359],
Γ3 = [0.8989 0.6047 0.4897 0.2866 0.2430],Γ4 = [0.7127 0.4047 0.3389 0.2663],
Γ5 = [0.5839 0.5486 0.5119 0.4490 0.3549].
(18)
If ωm,i is the i-th column of Ωm and and γm,i is the i-th element of Γm, then the sorted list
Q is the following:
Q = {γ3,1, γ2,1, γ4,1, γ3,2, γ1,1, γ5,1, γ5,2, γ5,3, γ1,2, γ3,3, γ1,3, γ1,4, γ5,4, γ1,5, γ2,2, γ4,2, γ2,3,
γ5,5, γ2,4, γ4,3, γ3,4, γ4,4, γ3,5, γ2,5} .
(19)
When Step 1 of the algorithm is executed, the coalition which forms corresponds the full rank
matrix
A1 =
[
−1 −1 −1 2
2 1 0 2
1 0 0 −1
−1 0 0 −1
]
. (20)
In this case, the relays which form the coalition are R3, R2, R4 and R1, using the coding vectors
ω3,1,ω2,1,ω4,1 and ω1,1. Using (9), every transmission rate is defined by γ1,1, thus the minimum
rate over the network is min (Rsl ) = γ1,1 = 0.5984 while the sum rate is
∑4
l=1R
s
l = 4γ1,1 =
2.3936. When Step 2 is executed, no other matrix with the same minimum rate but better sum
rate can be found, so in Step 3 it is A3 = A1.
Now let the minimum rate requirement be relaxed. When Step 4 is executed, it first tries to
replace ω1,1 in matrix A with another vector with γm,i < γ1,1. If W (ωm,i) denotes the weight
of ωm,i according to the list Q, the following weights are calculated:
• For γ5,1, since there is no zero element, W (ω5,1) = 4γ5,1 = 2.3356, which is smaller than
the previously calculated sum rate, thus ω5,1 is discarded.
• The next rate in Q is γ5,2 and since there is no zero element, W (ω5,1) = 4γ5,2 = 2.1944,
which is again smaller than the previously calculated sum rate, thus ω5,2 is discarded.
• For γ5,3, there is one zero element in ω5,3, thus the corresponding transmission rate, Rs3
will be assigned an ideal value, the best possible according to the list Q, which is γ3,1.
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Thus, W (ω5,3) = 3γ5,3+ γ3,1 = 2.4346, which is better than the previously calculated sum
rate. Thus ω3,1 is chosen.
After Step 4, a coalition with the following full rank matrix is found:
A4 =
[
−1 −1 −1 −1
2 1 0 −1
1 0 0 0
−1 0 0 1
]
, (21)
which contains the vectors ω3,1, ω2,1, ω4,1 and ω5,3. The minimum rate is min (Rsl ) = γ5,3 =
0.5119 while the sum rate is
∑4
l=1R
s
l = 3γ5,3 + γ3,1 = 2.4346. Note that the actual sum rate
in this case coincides with W (ω5,3), while the minimum rate meets the QoS requirement. The
matrix in (21) corresponds to the solution point Y in Fig. 3, and so after Step 5, A5 = A4.
Steps 4 and 5 are repeated in similar manner, and the algorithm ends with the following coding
matrix as a final solution:
A =
[
−1 −1 −1 −1
2 1 0 0
1 0 0 −1
−1 0 0 0
]
, (22)
which contains the vectors ω3,1, ω2,1, ω5,4 and ω4,2. The minimum rate is min (Rsl ) = γ4,2 =
0.4047 while the sum rate is
∑4
l=1R
s
l = 2γ4,2 + γ2,1 + γ3,1 = 2.5825. Note that the selection of
the matrix A is the dominant strategy, since it corresponds to the point on the Pareto frontier
which maximizes the sum rate.
The complexity of the algorithm generally increases when the length of Ωm, the value of
L and the value of M increase. However, the use of the weight function, combined with the
specific order of the search among vectors, using the list Q, drastically reduces the number of
coding matrices, whose sum rate and minimum rate are actually computed by the algorithm. This
reduction is evident for this transparent realization in Table I. More specifically, an exhaustive
search among all possible combinations of vectors between different relays would require the
formation of 2625 matrices for this specific example, while only 1809 of them are full rank.
However, with the use of the proposed algorithm and the use of the weight function, only 12
matrices are actually formed and their sum rate is checked, while all the rest are excluded since
they are dominated solutions. Finally, from these 12 matrices, only 3 correspond to points on
the Pareto frontier, and thus only 3 coalitions actually form.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the following, we present simulation results for the proposed coalition formation strategy,
for Gaussian distributed channel coefficients with distribution N (0, 1). The results examine the
effect of available relays on the sum rate and the utility functions of the players.
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TABLE I
FORMATION OF MATRICES BY THE COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
Formation of Matrices and Sum rates Number of Coding Matrices
All combinations of vectors 2625
All full rank matrices 1809
Matrix searches performed by Steps 2 and 4 12
Coalition formations performed by Steps 3 and 5 3
In Fig. 5, we study the effect of relay selection on the sum rate and profit maximization. The
sum rate of a network with L = 4 users and M = 4, 5, 6, 7 relays (black lines) and a network
with L = 6 users and M = 6, 7, 8, 9 relays (red lines) is depicted. The profit of the CD is also
indicated for arbitrary values of Z and (1−b), according to eqs. (13) and (14). The sets used for
the candidate vectors of the relays, are those constructed as described in Section V-A when the
full rank property is guaranteed. Simulations show that relay selection significantly improves the
network performance in terms of sum rate and profit. For L = 4, when the number of available
relays is increased from M = 4 to M = 5, relay selection improves the performance of the
network up to 3 dB, for SNR = 15 dB, while when the number of relays is increased to M = 7,
the gain is up to 6 dB, compared to the case of no relay selection (M = 4). Moreover, from
Fig. 5 one can observe that, the gain is smaller in each addition of an extra relay, compared
to the previous addition. Similar conclusions are shown for the case of L = 6. This implies
that as the number M of relays increases, although there is no upper bound to the performance,
the improvement due to relay selection becomes negligible, and there is no reason to add extra
nodes to the network.
In Fig. 6, the sum rate improvement offered by the proposed optimization is illustrated,
compared to the optimization performed in [24], which maximizes the minimum transmission
rate3. The minimum transmission rate is also illustrated. The presented results are for a network
with L = 4 sources and M = 5, 6 relays, with real or complex signaling. For a cost in the
average minimum transmission rate, a gain of up to 3 dB in the sum rate is achieved for real
signaling, for M = 5, while a gain of up to 2.5 dB is achieved for M = 6. It is remarkable that
3The results of [24] are calculated according to the logarithm with base 2 in this work, instead of the natural logarithm which
was used in [24].
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Fig. 6. Average Sum Rate and Average minimum rate for the optimization in [24] and the proposed strategy, for L=4 and
M=5,6 (real and complex signaling).
the proposed strategy for M = 5 outperforms the sum rate achieved by the optimization in [24]
even for M = 6, which means that an algorithmic optimization, which is performed by software,
may be favorable, compared to adding an extra node to the network, leading to reduced overall
cost. The gains for complex signaling are even greater, especially for low SNR values, reaching
a value of up to 6 dB. This is because the proposed optimization involves both the real and
imaginary part of the candidate vectors. Note that the optimization of a complex system with
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L = 4 corresponds to a real system of L′ = 8.
In Fig. 7, we present a special case when each Ωm comprises only one vector, in order to
directly compare with the scheme of [27]. The sum rate of the proposed algorithm for L = 4
and M = 8, 12 with real signaling is compared to the optimization schemes in [24], [27]. In our
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work, since we compare achievable rates when N → ∞, we consider the case of a field size
p → ∞ [8], which leads to the existence of few zero elements in the coding matrix. Thus, a
network decomposition is seldom achieved by the strategy in [27], which can also be seen in
the figure, since its performance is almost identical to that in [24]. Since the proposed algorithm
allows non-symmetric transmission rates, it achieves a gain up to 1.5 dB for the illustrated cases.
Note that, if the zero elements allow a network decomposition, the execution of our algorithm
will also perform the decomposition, in addition to exploiting the gain offered by non-symmetric
rates.
In Fig. 8, the average total utility of the top-coalition S∗, the average revenue for the CD and
the average revenue for one relay is depicted, for the case of L = 4 and for M = 4, 5, 6, 7, when
SNR = 5, 15 dB. The solid color corresponds to the proposed optimization while the pattern
corresponds to the optimization in [24]. The sets Ωm are constructed in a way to guarantee the
full rank property. The parameters for the revenues which were used are Z = 1 and b = 0.7.
The gain over previous results is up to 21% for the TU and for the case of M = 4, while the
results are similar for other values of M . Furthermore, both the profit of the CD and the average
profit of each relay are significantly increased with the proposed strategy. Another important
observation is that the TU and the CD profit increase, when the number of available relays
increases. However, for both optimization techniques, the average profit of one relay reduces.
This is expected, since the relay is not operating at all times (i.e., it is not always in the top-
coalition S∗), and thus it receives zero profit when it does not operate. Note that, in a practical
scenario, the relays which are not selected for a specific channel realization and do not receive
profit at that instant, may serve another group of users which do not belong to this network,
increasing their total profit.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a cloud network with surplus relays with respect to the users, which employs
Compute-and-Forward, was studied. Relay selection and PNC at the relays were performed,
which lead to the maximization of the total throughput under minimum rate constraints. This
maximization was explored with the use of the Pareto frontier, while the relay selection was
matched to a coalition formulation game. An efficient algorithm for the coalition formation was
proposed, which leads to the optimal solution in terms of sum rate and players’ profit. Extensive
examples and simulation results showed that the proposed strategy leads to an improvement of
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at least 1.5 dB for the sum rate of the network, compared to previous results in the literature.
Furthermore, the profit of the players is increased up to 21 %, while the solution provided by
the proposed algorithm has no profitable deviation, guaranteeing the stability of the partitioning
of the players.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to [30], given a non-empty set of players V ⊆ N , a non-empty subset of players
S ⊆ V is a top-coalition of V, iff for any i ∈ S and any T ⊆ V with i ∈ T , we have S i T .
A coalition formation game satisfies the top-coalition property iff for any non-empty subset of
players V ⊆ N , there exists a top coalition of V . Next, we prove that the proposed game has a
non-empty core.
Consider player i ∈ N . For any S, T ∈ Si(N ) with S 6= T , we define the following
preference, using the profit of each player as defined in eq. (14):
S i T ⇐⇒ φi(S) ≥ φi(T ) (23)
We next show that there is a top coalition for each V ⊆ N with V 6= 0. Let Q(V) = {S ∈
2V\{∅} : φi(S) ≥ φi(T ) ∀ T ∈ 2V\{∅}, ∀i ∈ S}.
• If V ∋ C and |V| ≥ L+ 1, according to eq. (13), there is always at least one coalition with
non-zero TU. The revenue of the CD is proportional to the TU, while the revenue of the
relays is proportional to the TU and inverse proportional to the size of the coalition. Thus,
the set Q(V) is non empty, containing the coalitions with minimum size, i.e. |S| = L+ 1,
which maximize the TU.
• In any other case, the TU and the revenue of the players is zero, thus the condition φi(S) ≥
φi(T ) holds with equality for any arbitrary non-empty set Q(V).
Consequently, each element S of Q(V) is a top-coalition of V . This is because, for any i ∈ S
and any T ∈ 2V\{∅} we have φi(S) ≥ φi(T ) which denotes a preference S i T . Therefore
the top coalition property is satisfied and thus there is a core partition, as shown in [30].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let V0 = N , then S∗ is a top-coalition of V0. That is, for any i ∈ S∗ and any T ⊆ V0 with
i ∈ T , S∗ i T . Indeed, for all i ∈ S∗, φi(S∗) ≥ φi(T ), for any T ⊆ V0. This is because, when
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|T | ≥ L + 1 and the coalition T contains the CD, then the sum rate of T cannot be greater
than that of S∗ and thus, according to eq. (13) and eq. (14), φi(S∗) ≥ φi(T ). In any other case,
according to eq. (13) and eq. (14), φi(T ) = 0 ≤ φi(S∗).
Now let V1 = V0\{S∗}, then S1 is a top-coalition of V1. Since |S1| = 1, then if i ∈ S1,
φi(S1) = 0. However, since C 6∈ V1, φi(T ) = 0 for any T ⊆ V1 and thus, φi(S1) ≥ φi(T ) for
any T ⊆ V1 (which actually holds with equality). Thus S1 is a top-coalition of V1. Working in
the same way for S2, . . . ,SM−L, this procedure defines the partition pi∗ = {S∗,S1, . . .SM−L}.
Observe that no agent in S∗ can profit from joining a coalitional deviation. Without the help of
agents in S∗, no agent in S1 could profit from joining a coalitional deviation. In general, without
the help of agents from earlier groups in the sequence, a profitable coalitional deviation is not
possible. Hence there is no profitable coalitional deviation and pi∗ is in the core.
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